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BRAM FOUBERT and ELS GIJSBRECHTS*
Bundle promotions—the practice of granting consumers a discount
when they buy a certain number of units from a designated range of
stockkeeping units—have gained popularity among manufacturers and
retailers. In this research, the authors investigate the purchase effects of
bundle promotions for a category of packaged goods. Contrary to
intuition, they find that promotional bundles are far more effective at
inducing switching than at boosting category sales. The strong switching
effects result from two mechanisms: (1) Stockkeeping units that are part
of a bundle promotion appear to reinforce each other’s choice probability,
and (2) the bundle discount tends to attract consumers even if they do
not buy enough to qualify for the price reduction. The weak category
effects follow from the notion that the purchase quantity requirement is
often too stringent to make consumers buy earlier and/or more in the
category. The authors develop incidence, quantity, and choice models
that incorporate the intricate bundle mechanisms, and they use
simulations to contrast the sales impact of bundle and traditional per-unit
promotions. On the basis of the model estimates, they present
managerial implications and tentative guidelines for optimal bundle 
design.
Shopper Response to Bundle Promotions for
Packaged Goods
Ongoing consolidations in the packaged goods industry
and the category management paradigm in retailing have
created a need for an integrated approach to the promotion
of product assortments. Manufacturers and retailers increas-
ingly have begun to adopt promotional tools that tout multi-
ple products simultaneously (e.g., Brandweek 2002). One
such technique is promotional bundling, or the practice of
temporarily selling a bundle of different items at a dis-
counted price. For example, a yogurt brand could offer a
discount if the consumer buys three units from a range of
flavors. Although promotional bundling has gained wide
acceptance in retailing, its impact on consumers’ purchase
decisions has not been sufficiently addressed in marketing
academia.
Extant price promotion literature focuses exclusively on
the effects of traditional per-unit discounts and has not stud-
ied bundle offers as a distinct type of price promotion (e.g.,
Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan 1999; Pauwels, Hanssens,
and Siddarth 2002). However, bundle promotions differ sig-
nificantly from per-unit discounts in that a bundle requires
that consumers buy a specific number of units from a range
of items. Although bundling (e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson
2000; Chung and Rao 2003; Stremersch and Tellis 2002)
and multiunit packaging/quantity discount strategies (e.g.,
Allenby et al. 2004; Gerstner and Hess 1987; Wilcox et al.
1987) have been studied, in general, they have been consid-
ered regular pricing issues rather than promotional devices.
Moreover, most bundling research is constrained to the con-
text of durables and services, areas in which consumers
usually are interested in only one unit of each item. The lit-
erature on multiunit packaging releases this constraint but
introduces another by exclusively addressing packages of a
single item (e.g., a six-pack of one brand of beer).
In this study, we empirically investigate the purchase
effects of bundle promotions in a category of consumer
packaged goods. We address settings in which both the bun-
dles and the separate items (at their regular prices) are for648 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, NOVEMBER 2007
sale (“mixed bundling”; Adams and Yellen 1976) and con-
sumers themselves determine the composition of the bun-
dle. Thus, we investigate promotions of the type “Pick 2,
get $.50 off” or “Buy one, get one free.” We describe a bun-
dle promotion in terms of three characteristics: discount,
range (i.e., the designated set of items to which the promo-
tion applies), and quantity requirement (i.e., the number of
units that must be purchased).
The purpose of this research is twofold. First, we shed
light on the mechanisms that affect purchase decisions in
the context of bundle promotions. We find that bundle pro-
motions trigger several mechanisms that induce pronounced
switching behavior. However, a bundle promotion’s poten-
tial to make consumers buy earlier and/or more in the cate-
gory turns out to be surprisingly limited. Second, we deter-
mine the net effect of these mechanisms by evaluating a
bundle’s impact on the unit sales of an individual stock-
keeping unit (SKU), a brand line, and the whole category.
We clarify the role of the bundle characteristics and com-
pare the impact of bundle promotions with that of tradi-
tional per-unit discounts. Among other things, the results
indicate that bundle promotions tend to be more effective
than per-unit promotions if the goal is to increase item or
brand line sales, but they are less effective in terms of cate-
gory sales. This research comes at a time when the practice
of promotional bundling is pervasive enough to allow
empirical analysis but is still novel enough to benefit from a
better understanding of its effects.
To achieve our objectives, we calibrate choice, quantity,
and incidence models on consumer panel data in the snack
chip category. At various points in the decision process, the
intrinsic characteristics of bundling require a different mod-
eling approach than that demanded by per-unit promotions.
Therefore, in addition to a substantive contribution, we pro-
pose adapted statistical models that accommodate promo-
tional bundles for consumer packaged goods.
We organize the remainder of this article as follows: In
the next section, we discuss the effects of promotional
bundling on consumers’ purchase decisions. We then pres-
ent choice, quantity, and incidence models that account for
the effects of the different bundle characteristics and cali-
brate the models with data from the snack chip category.
Next, we simulate different bundle scenarios to evaluate the
impact of bundles on sales, both overall and in comparison
with per-unit promotions. Finally, we conclude with some
managerial implications and directions for further research.
THE EFFECTS OF BUNDLE PROMOTIONS
A vast body of research documents the effects of price
promotions on consumers’ purchase behavior and distin-
guishes between choice effects (what to buy) and incidence/
quantity effects (whether and how much to buy in the cate-
gory). Price promotions induce consumers to switch items
and buy more and earlier in the category, otherwise known
as the acceleration effect (e.g., Ailawadi and Neslin 1998;
Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan 1999; Neslin 2002). In a
bundle context, the choice effects cannot be studied inde-
pendently of the quantity effects. For example, consider a
bundle promotion that grants a discount of $.40 on the pur-
chase of two bags of Lay’s chips. For a consumer who usu-
ally buys one bag of Kettle chips, switching to Lay’s pays
off only if he or she is prepared to increase purchase vol-
1Other authors have also adopted this quantity-then-choice sequence; it
is the most obvious approach to tackle multi-item purchases (e.g., Bucklin,
Gupta, and Siddarth 1998; Dillon and Gupta 1996; Harlam and Lodish
1995).
2In the current context, a bundle promotion does not force consumers to
accept different items; they may also purchase several units of the same
item. However, probabilistically, the bundle’s pressure works in both direc-
tions. Thus, at the choice level, we discuss the bundle’s ability to force
consumers to accept multiple units of different items.
3This research stream demonstrates that a seller can extend its market
power by bundling its product with some other good that is produced in a
more competitive market.
ume in the category. These interdependencies must be
accounted for in our exposition of the expected bundle
effects and subsequent models. We first address the choice
effects and then discuss the incidence and quantity effects.
Choice Effects
In the context of bundle promotions, the quantity deci-
sion influences the choice decision; therefore, we conceptu-
alize consumers’ choices given their category purchase
quantities.1 Specifically, we distinguish between two cases
in which the consumer’s total purchase quantity (1) equals
or exceeds the bundle quantity requirement or (2) is lower
than the bundle quantity requirement.
In the first case, consumers have a clear economic motive
to switch. Allocating a large enough share of their total pur-
chase quantity in the category to one or more bundle-
promoted items enables them to take advantage of the bun-
dle discount. Thus:
H1: When a consumer’s total purchase quantity in the category
equals or exceeds the bundle quantity requirement, the bun-
dle discount has a positive impact on a bundle item’s choice
probability.
Because a bundle promotion involves a range of items,
consumers may consider switching to several bundle items
simultaneously. However, the decision to switch to one bun-
dle item is not made independently of the decision to switch
to another. Buying one bundle item may enhance the likeli-
hood that the consumer will also switch to another bundle
item in an attempt to meet the bundle quantity require-
ment.2 In other words, when the utility of one bundle item
rises, a consumer’s willingness to allocate the required pur-
chase quantity to the bundle range will increase, thus lever-
aging the choice probabilities of all bundle items compared
with those of nonbundle items. Inspired by the industrial
organization literature on bundling (e.g., Martin 1999;
Whinston 1990),3 we refer to this phenomenon as the
“leverage effect.”
From a behavioral perspective, this leverage effect bears
some resemblance to the “cluster effect,” a context effect in
which adding an item to a choice set helps similar items in
the choice set (Sivakumar 1995). In contrast to the cluster
effect, however, the bundle-promotion leverage effect does
not stem from the items’ similarity but rather from the con-
sumer’s understanding that constraining his or her selection
of items to the limited bundle set will lead to a monetary
benefit. Thus:
H2: When a consumer’s total purchase quantity in the category
equals or exceeds the bundle quantity requirement, the bun-
dle items leverage each other’s choice probability.Shopper Response to Bundle Promotions 649
4Note that this scenario does not describe a traditional case of compara-
tive pricing, in which the regular price provides an external cue that deter-
mines the attractiveness of the deal price. Here, we argue that the promo-
tional bundle price may influence the evaluation of the regular per-unit
price.
In the second case, when the total purchase quantity is
lower than the bundle quantity requirement, a rational con-
sumer might be expected to refrain from any promotional
reaction because the bundle discount is out of reach. How-
ever, we believe that consumers may still respond to the
bundle discount as a result of both positive and negative
psychological effects. On the positive side, consumers may
process the promotional information only partially and
notice the discount but ignore the quantity requirement.
Previous research has demonstrated that consumers do not
always engage in detailed information processing when
confronted with price promotions (Inman, McAlister, and
Hoyer 1990). Consequently, the bundle discount may be
able to entice even those consumers who do not actually
benefit from the promotion. We call this phenomenon the
“discount communication effect.”
On the negative side, if consumers process all bundle
information and thus realize that they do not qualify for the
discount, they may switch away from the bundle-promoted
items. Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang (2002) find evidence
of a betrayal effect, by which consumers switch to another
brand if they become aware that their favorite brand offers
deals to other select consumers. Their research is grounded
in relative deprivation and perceived fairness theories.
Another explanation for potential negative switching effects
emerges from the reference price literature (Kopalle and
Lindsey-Mullikin 2003; Mayhew and Winer 1992). By
offering a bundle at a reduced price, the seller provides an
external reference price, which may reduce the consumer’s
willingness to purchase the items at the regular price.4 In
any case, according to both the betrayal and the reference
price rationales, a bundle discount may induce negative
switching behavior among consumers who do not qualify
for the bundle promotion.
Because the existing literature does not provide any indi-
cation about which effect will prevail—the positive dis-
count communication or the negative betrayal/reference
effect—we leave this point as an empirical question and
hypothesize the following:
H3:  Even when a consumer’s total purchase quantity in the
category is lower than the bundle quantity requirement, 
the bundle discount affects the bundle items’ choice
probabilities.
Incidence/Quantity Effects
Similar to per-unit promotions, bundle offers that involve
deeper discounts or apply to a wider range of items should
enhance consumers’ category purchase quantities and inci-
dences. However, unlike per-unit promotions, bundle pro-
motions do not allow consumers to accelerate (i.e., buy
more and/or earlier) as they see fit; rather, consumers must
respect the bundle’s quantity requirement. Therefore, the
bundle’s impact at the incidence and quantity level is not
the mere result of the bundle’s discount or range but also
includes mechanisms triggered by the quantity requirement.
5We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
With regard to a consumer’s quantity decision, we argue
that the quantity requirement works in opposite ways. On
the one hand, a higher quantity requirement pushes the con-
sumer to buy more. The higher the quantity requirement,
the more consumers must buy to receive the discount. In
addition, Wansink, Kent, and Hoch (1998) demonstrate that
even in the absence of price discounts, suggested purchase
quantities could lead consumers to accelerate. That is, the
bundle’s quantity requirement may serve as a benchmark on
which consumers anchor their quantity decision, thus lead-
ing to higher purchase quantities.5
On the other hand, an increasing quantity requirement
drives up the consumer’s burden in terms of transaction and
inventory costs (see Gerstner and Hess 1987). Conse-
quently, if the quantity requirement becomes too high, the
consumer will be more reluctant to accept the bundle pro-
motion. From that point on, the quantity requirement lowers
the impact of the bundle promotion.
H4: All else being equal, as long as a bundle’s quantity require-
ment does not exceed some critical point, it increases the
impact of the bundle promotion on the consumer’s purchase
quantity. Beyond that point, it decreases the bundle’s
impact.
At the incidence level, when the consumer weighs pur-
chasing in the category against the no-purchase option, we
theorize that the quantity requirement will only reduce the
bundle’s impact; that is, when the quantity requirement
increases, so do the efforts required from the consumer. As
a result, the bundle will become less attractive and less
effective in stimulating purchase incidence.
H5:  All else being equal, the quantity requirement negatively
affects a bundle promotion’s impact on a consumer’s pur-
chase incidence.
MODELING APPROACH
To assess the effects of bundle promotions, we build
response models at the level of the individual consumer. In
particular, we model the probability that a consumer h buys
the quantities (qh1t, qh2t, …, qhIt) of the I items in the prod-
uct category on shopping trip t. This probability, denoted as
Pht(qh1t, qh2t, …, qhIt), can be broken up into three compo-
nent probabilities:
where Pht(purchase) is the probability that consumer h
decides to buy in the category (incidence decision);
Pht(Qht|purchase) refers to the probability that consumer h
purchases a total quantity of Qht units, given a category pur-
chase (quantity decision); and Pht(qh1t, qh2t, …, qhIt|Qht) is
the probability of a specific allocation of Qht across items,
such that Qht = Σiqhit (choice decision). Figure 1 depicts
these three consumer decisions in the face of a bundle
promotion.
In the following discussion, we first present the choice
model and then address quantity and incidence. We charac-
(1) P q , q , ..., q P purchase ht h1t h2t hIt ht () = ()
× × () × P Q purchase P q , q , ..., q ht ht ht h1t h2t hIt Q Qht () ,650 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, NOVEMBER 2007












CONSUMERS’ PURCHASE DECISIONS IN THE FACE OF A BUNDLE PROMOTION
terize bundle promotions by their bundle discount BDt
(expressed per weight unit), range of bundle items BRt, and
quantity requirement BQt (Table 1 summarizes these and
other symbols).
Choice Model
Because choice is preceded by the quantity decision, we
can treat the total purchase quantity Qht as a given. Similar
to Dillon and Gupta (1996) and Bucklin, Gupta, and Sid-
darth (1998), we assume that a consumer allocates this total
quantity across the items in the product category by making
Qht individual choices. As a result, (qh1t, qh2t, …, qhIt) fol-
lows a multinomial distribution:
where Phit is the probability that consumer h buys item i on
shopping trip t. In the absence of bundle promotions, Phit
takes a classic multinomial logit (MNL) form (Dillon and
Gupta 1996). However, when consumers are confronted
with promotional bundles, the specification becomes com-
plicated by the dependence of the choice effects on total
purchase quantity. To account for this quantity–choice rela-
tionship, we introduce two choice probability structures.
(2) P q , q , ..., q Q
Q!
q!















The validity of one or the other depends on whether the
consumer qualifies for the bundle discount (see Figure 1).
Thus, we allow for two regimes with different choice
response patterns, in which the prevailing regime is the out-
come of another stochastic process, namely, the quantity
decision. Our use of a two-regime model is similar to that of
Vakratsas and colleagues (2004).
When a consumer does not buy enough in the category to
qualify for the bundle discount (i.e., Qht < BQt), the choice
probabilities maintain a classic MNL form. We refer to this
probability structure as  and write the
items’ deterministic utility  as
where  γy is a parameter vector and Yhit is a vector of
consumer-, time-, and item-specific variables. Furthermore,
although the consumer does not qualify for the bundle pro-
motion, we include BDit because the featured bundle dis-
count may still affect the appeal of the bundle items. Thus,
parameter γnb enables us to test H3, and its sign will reveal
the existence of positive discount communication effects or
negative betrayal/reference price effects.
When the consumer qualifies for the bundle discount
(i.e., Qht ≥ BQt), the probability structure becomes
, and the bundle items’ utility function
takes the following form:










it =+ × ′ γγ ,
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Symbol Description
UDt Per-unit discount (if any) on shopping trip t.
BDt Bundle discount (if any) on shopping trip t.
BQt Bundle quantity requirement (if any) on shopping trip t.
BRt Bundle range (if any) on shopping trip t.
qhit Purchase quantity of item i for consumer h on shopping trip t.
Qht Total purchase quantity in the category for consumer h on
shopping trip t.
Phit Probability that consumer h chooses item i on shopping trip t,
in the absence of bundle promotions.
Phit
nb Probability that consumer h chooses item i on shopping trip t,
given that Qht < BQt.
Phit
b Probability that consumer h chooses item i on shopping trip t,
given that Qht ≥ BQt.
CUDht Per-unit discount at category level for consumer h on
shopping trip t.
CBDht Bundle discount at category level for consumer h on shopping
trip t.




6We recognize that a consumer may switch to the bundle items and buy
only a fraction of the bundle quantity requirement. However, this is not a
major concern in our data set because in 91.9% of the occasions for which
Qht ≥ BQt, the purchase quantity for the bundle items corresponds to an
integer multiple of the quantity requirement.
where γb gauges the mere impact of the bundle discount. We
expect γb to differ from γnb in Equation 3 because the appeal
of the bundle discount in this case is based on other (more
rational) arguments. Given that Qht ≥ BQt, the bundle dis-
count is now within the consumer’s reach and therefore is
likely to increase the bundle items’utilities (see H1).6 How-
ever, the bundle promotion may not only affect utilities as
such but also create interrelationships among the bundle
items as a result of the leverage effect (H2). Indeed, con-
sumers attracted by one bundle item may also select other
bundle items to meet the bundle quantity requirement. Con-
sequently, if a bundle-promoted item gains attractiveness,
this will be more detrimental to items outside the bundle
range than to the other items within the bundle range. Train,
Ben-Akiva, and Atherton (1989) and Lee (1999) use a
nested MNL model with a scale parameter greater than 1 to
model such response patterns, in which consumers are more
likely to switch to or away from a set of items than among
the items within that set. Accordingly, we accommodate the
interrelationships among the bundle items using a nested
MNL model, in which the nest consists of the bundle-
promoted items (see Figure 1), and we expect a scale
parameter greater than 1. Thus, a bundle item’s choice
probability can be expressed as (see McFadden 1981)




it =+ × ′ γγ ,
7Subsequently, we argue that though μ > 1, our model remains consis-
tent with random utility theory within the data range.
and the choice probability of a nonbundle item k is as
follows:
where
refers to the inclusive value of the nested items and μ is the
scale parameter of the nested logit model (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman 1985). Again, to find evidence of the leverage
effect, μ should exceed 1.7 To understand this, we must ana-
lyze the ratio between the choice probability of a bundle
item i ∈ BRt and that of a nonbundle item k ∉ BRt, given
that Qht ≥ BQt. We can verify that
where Phit( ) and Phkt( ) refer to the choice probabili-
ties in the absence (presence) of bundle promotions. Thus,
Equation 7 shows how the choice probability of a bundle
item i, compared with that of a nonbundle item k, is
affected in the shift from a nonbundling to a bundling situa-
tion. The first factor on the right-hand side represents the
mere discount effect and exceeds 1 if γb is positive. The sec-
ond factor is greater than 1 if μ > 1 (the term in parentheses
is item i’s share within the bundle), in which case it repre-
sents the leverage effect. Note that for a given μ > 1, the
leverage effect gains strength when the other bundle items’
choice probabilities increase. However, the leverage effect
collapses when i is the only item in the bundle.
Total Quantity and Incidence Model
The quantity decision (conditional on incidence) is mod-
eled by means of a zero-truncated Poisson regression in
which the consumer’s average purchase rate λht is an expo-
nential function of several explanatory variables. The inci-
dence decision is specified as a binomial logit model in
which the category attractiveness Vht is a linear function of
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H1. If Qht ≥ BQt, the bundle discount
has a positive impact on the bundle
item’s choice probability (mere
discount effect).
γb > 0 
H2. If Qht ≥ BQt, the bundle items
leverage up each other’s choice
probability (leverage effect).
μ > 1 
H3. If Qht < BQt, the bundle discount
still affects the bundle item’s choice
probability.
γnb ≠ 0 
(γnb > 0)
Incidence/Quantity Model
H4. At quantity level, the quantity
requirement first enhances and then








H5. At incidence level, the quantity
requirement negatively affects the








HYPOTHESES, CORRESPONDING MODEL PARAMETERS, AND
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
8This does not mean that consumers chose from 220 different SKUs on
a given shopping trip; the actual assortments varied across store chains and
over time.
Risso, Bucklin, and Morrisson 1999). We propose the fol-
lowing expressions:
where βx and αx are parameter vectors and Xht is a vector
consisting of a constant and consumer- and time-specific
variables. The variable CBDht refers to the category-level
bundle discount and is computed as the weighted average of
BDit across the SKUs in the category, in which the weights
reflect a consumer’s SKU preferences. In particular, these
weights are based on attribute-specific loyalties computed
over an initialization period (see the Appendix). As such,
CBDht captures both the bundle promotion’s discount depth
and the bundle range. Furthermore, we account for the
impact of the quantity requirement BQt. Because the strin-
gency of the quantity requirement is consumer specific—
for example, a bundle of three units is more of an imposi-
tion for a consumer who usually buys one unit than for a
consumer who usually buys two—we normalize BQt by
dividing it by the consumer’s average purchase quantity. We
refer to this consumer-specific version of BQt as the bun-
dle’s quantity pressure QPht:
(9) QPht = BQt/AVQh,
where AVQh refers to consumer h’s average purchase quan-
tity in the category across purchase occasions during an ini-
tialization period. We use a quadratic polynomial to model
the impact of QPht at the quantity and incidence levels. At
the quantity level, this functional form accommodates the
inverted U-shaped effect we proposed in H4; that is, for a
given consumer, increasing the quantity requirement is
rewarding up to some point but counterproductive there-
after. At the incidence level, H5 requires the polynomial to
decrease monotonically in QPht, such that for a given con-
sumer, raising the quantity requirement lowers the inci-
dence probability. In the first two columns of Table 2, we
summarize the proposed mechanisms at the different deci-
sion levels and the corresponding model parameters.
APPLICATION
We calibrate our models with consumer panel data from
the snack chip category. In the following sections, we
briefly describe the characteristics of our data and then dis-
cuss the estimation, results, and validation of our models.
Data
We apply our models to countrywide consumer panel
data provided by GfK. The data set covers the years 1999–
2000. All 1181 panelists in our sample made at least 10 pur-
chases in the chip category during those two years. We dis-
tinguish among 220 different SKUs, which account for
96.9% of category unit sales.8 These SKUs are distinct
types (e.g., corn, potato, extruded), flavors, and sizes of 17
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different chip brands. Altogether, the panelists made
116,885 shopping trips and 31,745 SKU purchases in eight
different store chains. We combine the GfK data with Publi
Info promotional information, which provides rich and
detailed descriptions of promotions at the store-chain and
SKU levels.
In Table 3, we summarize the main characteristics of the
bundle promotions in our data set. During all shopping
trips, consumers were confronted with 19,949 bundle pro-
motions, which typically involved several SKUs. Bundle
promotions, similar to per-unit promotions, occurred for
virtually all chip types, flavors, and package sizes but were
offered by only a limited number of brands. Still, these
brands include both national and private labels and repre-
sent both low- and high-end brands. Furthermore, 11% of
the bundle promotions occurred across type categories (i.e.,
the bundled SKUs belong to different types), and 87%
occurred across flavors. However, a given bundle always
contained SKUs of the same brand and similar size. Finally,





Price discount (cents/ounces) 3.30 1.88
Bundle Promotions
Price discount (cents/ounces) 4.18 1.63
Quantity requirement 3.70 .77
Range (number of bundle items) 4.78 3.55Shopper Response to Bundle Promotions 653
9To enhance comparability, we computed these average shares only for
the SKUs that had been promoted both on a per-unit basis and as part of a
bundle during the observation period.
10Our decision to neutralize all promotional effects in INCht and incor-
porate CUDht and CBDht is driven by the need to test and compare the
impact of per-unit and bundle promotions on incidence and quantity. Still,
we also tested two models in which INCht included promotion effects (see
Grover and Srinivasan 1992). In the first model, the promotion effects
could manifest themselves only through INCht; in the second model, we
also included CUDht and CBDht. Both models performed worse than our
approach in terms of within-sample and out-of-sample fit. We are grateful
to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these extra tests.
as “Pick Y units for only $X,” as opposed to “Pick Y units,
get $X off.”
To give a first impression of consumers’ reaction pat-
terns, we provide several tentative response indicators in
Table 4. Of all the shopping trips that did not involve a price
promotion, 12.2% led to a purchase in the category (i.e., a
purchase occasion). This incidence percentage was 18.5%
for shopping trips on which consumers were confronted
with per-unit promotions and 13.8% for shopping trips with
bundle promotions. On purchase occasions without price
promotions, consumers, on average, bought 2.20 units in
the category. This average purchase quantity increased to
2.81 in the presence of per-unit promotions and 2.41 in the
presence of bundle promotions. We further find that the
average choice share was 1.6% for nonpromoted SKUs,
2.9% for per-unit promoted SKUs, and 3.1% for bundle-
promoted SKUs.9 Finally, across purchase occasions, the
uptake was 4.7% for per-unit promoted SKUs and 5.0% for
bundle-promoted SKUs. Evidently, we must exercise cau-
tion when interpreting these figures because they depend on
current promotion practices and may not reveal potential
promotion effectiveness.
Estimation
Because we plan to compare bundle offers with tradi-
tional per-unit promotions, we include per-unit discount
variables in our choice, quantity, and incidence models. At
the incidence and quantity levels, we compute the per-unit
discount variable CUDht similarly to CBDht—namely, as a
weighted average of all per-unit discounts in the category.
Furthermore, at the choice level, we add attribute-level
intercepts, loyalty indexes, and attribute-specific purchase-
feedback dummies. In the incidence and quantity models,
we include intercepts, consumption rate, inventory, and the
inclusive value INCht, which is based on the choice-level
parameters and captures the expected maximum utility of
buying in the category (Grover and Srinivasan 1992). We
compute INCht as if there were no promotions in the cate-
gory to ensure that CUDht and CBDht capture the full dis-
count effect.10 In other words, we allow assortment charac-
teristics and consumers’ SKU preferences on a given
shopping trip to affect consumers’ incidence and quantity
decisions (through INCht), and we separately model the
11Because our data are at the SKU level and pertain to eight different
store chains, our “joint” data set contains more than 7 million records.
Combined with the many nonlinearities in the likelihood function, this
makes simultaneous estimation of all three levels (choice, quantity, and
incidence) intractable (for similar observations, see Ailawadi and Neslin
1998; Jedidi, Mela, and Gupta 1999).
12Note that with a scale parameter greater than 1, the model is not glob-
ally consistent with random utility maximization (Train 2002). Several
other researchers have found similar and much higher scale parameters,
albeit in different contexts (see, e.g., Lee [1999], who finds a scale parame-
ter equal to 2.67; Train, Ben-Akiva, and Atherton [1989], who find a scale
parameter equal to 1.19; and Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva [1987],
impact of price promotions. In the Appendix, we describe
the included variables precisely.
To accommodate unobserved consumer heterogeneity,
we model all promotion parameters (as well as other
parameters; see the Appendix) as normally distributed ran-
dom coefficients. We calibrate our models through simu-
lated maximum likelihood (Train 2002). We first estimate
the choice model, then use household-specific choice
parameters to compute INCht, and finally estimate the
incidence/quantity model.11 Because some variables need
to be initialized, we designate the first 15% of each con-
sumer’s purchase history (with a minimum of four purchase
occasions) as the warm-up period.
Results
Choice model. In Table 5, we summarize the estimation
results of the choice model. In the interest of space, we do
not report the attribute-level constants. As is indicated by
the coefficients of the loyalty indexes and the mean
purchase-feedback effects, in general, households are most
loyal to the brand and least loyal to the type of chips.
Although all mean feedback effects are positive and signifi-
cant, this does not mean that variety seeking does not take
place at all. For example, the relatively large variance in the
type feedback parameter implies that though 79% of the
households have a positive feedback parameter, 21% tend to
switch over time between different chip types (e.g., corn,
potato). Moreover, households with positive feedback
parameters may still exhibit “within-trip” variety seeking
and repeat-purchase the same, though varied, set of items.
The population mean of the per-unit discount coefficient
(.10) is positive and significant (p < .001). For the discus-
sion of the bundle-related coefficients, we distinguish
between the two choice regimes. When Qht ≥ BQt, the bun-
dle discount parameter γb and the scale parameter μ are the
relevant bundle coefficients (see Table 2). The estimated
mean for γb (.17) is positive and significant (p < .001),
which confirms that the mere bundle discount increases the
bundle items’ choice probabilities (H1). We also note that
this mean is significantly higher (p < .05) than the mean
per-unit discount effect. Furthermore, the estimated mean
for the scale parameter μ (1.33) is significantly higher than
1 (p < .001), which corroborates H2 that when Qht ≥ BQt,
the bundle items leverage each other’s choice probability.12
Table 4
TENTATIVE PROMOTION RESPONSE INDICATORS
No Promotion Per-Unit Promotion Bundle Promotion
Purchase incidence 12.2% 18.5% 13.8%
Average purchase quantity 2.20 2.81 2.41
Average choice share 1.6% 2.9% 3.1%654 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, NOVEMBER 2007
Table 5
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR CHOICE MODEL
Parameter Estimates (SE)
Loyalty Measures
γtloy (type loyalty) .81 (.027)
γbloy (brand loyalty) 1.95 (.027)
γfloy (flavor loyalty) 1.73 (.026)




γlt (last type purchased) .42 (.022) .69 (.023)
γlb (last brand purchased) .98 (.026) 1.05 (.026)
γlf (last flavor purchased) .89 (.019) .71 (.019)
γls (last size purchased) .48 (.022) .91 (.022)
Promotion Effects
γud (per-unit discount) .10 (.007) .25 (.009)
γnb (bundle discount, Qht < BQt) .07 (.027) .20 (.034)
γb (bundle discount, Qht ≥ BQt) .17 (.035) .69 (.052)




aBased on a rescaled likelihood function.
Notes: AIC = Akaike information criterion, and BIC = Bayesian infor-
mation criterion.
Table 6





αcud (category per-unit discount) .44 (.03) .43 (.05)
αcbd (category bundle discount) –.06 (.09) .15 (.11)
αqp (quantity pressure) –.09 (.05) .10 (.03)
αqp2 (quantity pressure2) .01 (.02) .01 (.01)
Quantity
exp(βcud × ) 1.06 (.01) .06 (.01)
exp(βcbd × ) 1.005 (.02) .11 (.03)
exp(βqp × ) 1.25 (.11) .20 (.06)




aBased on a rescaled likelihood function.






who even report a value of 4.18). Typically, these authors interpret the
parameters in a purely statistical sense, such that the size of the scale
parameter simply captures the degree of substitutability between alterna-
tives. Most important, however, a scale parameter greater than 1 does not
necessarily keep a model from being locally consistent with random utility
maximization (i.e., consistent within the range of sensible data points). To
check for local consistency, we use the procedure that Herriges and Kling
(1996) and Kling and Herriges (1995) describe, which involves testing two
necessary conditions. We find that within the range of observed data
points, our model is locally compatible with utility maximization. Details
are available on request.
13Given that the random coefficients follow a normal distribution, 
the factors exp(βk × xk) are log-normally distributed with mean m = 
When Qht < BQt, the parameter of interest is γnb, which
captures any remaining switching behavior. In support of
H3, we find that the estimated population mean for γnb (.07)
is significantly different from 0 (p < .01). The positive sign
indicates that the average consumer, even when he or she
does not qualify for the bundle discount, switches to the
promoted items. This finding reveals that the mere commu-
nication of the bundle discount attracts consumers to the
promoted items.
Incidence/quantity model. To save space, we report only
the results for the promotion parameters (see Table 6; the
other parameters are significant and in the expected direc-
tion). For the mixed truncated Poisson model, it is impor-
tant to stress that neither the size nor the sign of the esti-
mated population means can be readily interpreted. The
reason is that the purchase rate λht is an exponential and,
thus, highly asymmetric ad hoc transformation of the ran-
dom coefficients (e.g., Aitchison and Ho 1989; Chib,
Greenberg, and Winkelmann 1998). As a result, it is much
more instructive to write λht as a product of the form
exp(β1 × x1) × exp(β2 × x2) × … and study the mean and
standard deviation of the individual factors (see Goldberger
1968).13 The estimation results for the quantity model in
exp and standard deviation s = m × {exp[(xk ×
σβk)2] – 1}.5. Because these measures depend on xk, we evaluate them for
the mean value of xk. The reported standard errors of m and s are based on
simulation.
14At the quantity level, the impact is computed for the average value of
CBD, the category-level bundle discount. However, even for very high val-
ues, the discount impact remains nonsignificant.
[( ) / ] βσ β kk k k
2 xx ×+ × 2
Table 6 pertain to these converted factors and should be
evaluated relative to 1. That is, a factor greater than 1 indi-
cates that, on average, the corresponding variable positively
affects λht, whereas a factor lower than 1 reveals the oppo-
site. (The original parameter estimates are available on
request.)
For per-unit promotions, we find that, on average, the
discount variable has a positive impact on category utility
and purchase quantity. At the incidence level, the popula-
tion mean for αcud (.44) is significantly greater than 0 (p <
.001), and at the quantity level, the population mean (1.06)
for the factor exp(βcud × ) is significantly greater than
1 (p < .001).
For bundle promotions, on average, the discount variable
does not significantly affect either incidence or purchase
quantity.14 However, because a bundle discount does not
operate independently of the quantity requirement, a more
accurate assessment of the bundle impact would evaluate
× CBD +  × QP +  × QP2 at the incidence level
and exp( × CBD +  × QP +  × QP2) at the quan-
tity level. To study the role of the quantity requirement and,
thus, QP in this overall bundle impact (see H4 and H5), we
keep CBD constant at its average value and vary the value
of QP. In Figure 2, Panels A and B, we plot the population
means of these expressions as a function of QP.
In support of H5, we find in Figure 2, Panel A, that
increasing the quantity requirement and, thus, QP nega-
tively affects the bundle’s mean impact on incidence. Sur-
prisingly, however, even for small QP values, the total bun-
dle effect on incidence does not exceed zero. Apparently,
any quantity requirement (i.e., at least two units) is too
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A: Incidence Level (Population mean for αcbd × + αqp × QP + 
αqp2 × QP2 as a function of QP)
CBD B: Quantity Level (Population mean for exp(βcbd × + βqp × QP +
βqp2 × QP2) as a function of QP)
CBD
Notes: In Panel A, the bold line on the QP axis marks the zone where the curve is significantly lower than 0 (p < .05). In Panel B, the bold line on the QP
axis marks the zone in which the curve is significantly higher than 1 (p < .05).
Figure 2
IMPACT OF QUANTITY PRESSURE ON INCIDENCE AND QUANTITY
when the quantity requirement rises and QP exceeds .4, the
mean bundle impact becomes significantly negative (p <
.05). Even if we compute household-specific coefficients,
we find that for almost all panelists, bundling tends to affect
incidence negatively, especially when QP becomes large.
We can interpret this finding by referring to the same prin-
ciples that we used to explain potential negative switching
effects at the choice level. That is, consumers who consider
the quantity requirement too stringent may deem it to be
unfair that the promoted brand offers price reductions only
to consumers who meet the quantity requirement and there-
fore may cancel the category purchase altogether (see Fein-
berg, Krishna, and Zhang 2002). A slightly different argu-
ment is that these consumers use the bundle price as an
external reference price (see Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin
2003), which may reduce their willingness to pay the regu-
lar price. The higher QP, the more likely the consumer feels
forced to turn to the regularly priced unbundled items and
therefore engages in adverse purchase reactions.
In turn, we use Figure 2, Panel B, to confirm the inverted
U-shaped effect predicted in H4. For the average consumer,
increasing the quantity requirement (and, thus, QP)
enhances the bundle’s impact on purchase quantity up to
some point but tempers the impact after that point. Only for
a select range of QP values does the average bundle impact
approximate a per-unit promotion’s average impact (1.06).
For relatively high QP values, the plotted curve drops below
1, which implies that for those QP values, the bundle pro-
motion lowers consumers’ purchase quantities on average.
However, this effect becomes significant only when QP
exceeds 5, which is outside the range of actually observed
QP values.
Validation
To assess the impact of bundle promotions, we developed
and estimated modified incidence, quantity, and choice
models. In this section, we report additional checks on
whether the proposed models actually gauge the phenom-
ena of interest and accommodate the bundle mechanisms
better than more naive specifications. Subsequently, we
report the relative performance of several benchmark mod-
els and discuss the validity of the scale parameter of the
nested logit model as a measure of the leverage effect.
Benchmark models. First, we compare our proposed
choice and incidence/quantity models with traditional MNL
and truncated Poisson models that ignore the peculiarities
of the bundle promotion and assume an equivalent discount
on a per-unit basis. This is how existing models would
accommodate bundle promotions. In Table 7, CHOICE1
and INCIQUAN1 refer to these more naive benchmark
models. Second, we estimate a choice model (CHOICE2)
that corresponds to our proposed choice model but lacks the
bundle nest and thus ignores the interdependencies among
bundle items. We (re)estimate all the models, including our
full models, for a subsample of the original data set to per-
mit out-of-sample model evaluation. The holdout sample
comprises the last four months of the observation period. As
we portray in Table 7, the results indicate that our full mod-
els outperform simpler benchmark models in terms of both
within-sample fit (log-likelihood, Akaike information crite-
rion, and Bayesian information criterion) and out-of-sample
predictive power (we compute the log-likelihood on the
observations in the holdout sample). Given the relatively
limited number of bundle observations that benefit from a
more sophisticated model structure, we assert that the
improvements in model performance are substantial.
Leverage effect. Although the comparison of CHOICE2
with our full choice model offers an initial indication of the
importance of modeling item interdependencies, we carry
out three additional validity checks. First, we test for depar-
tures from the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
property after we remove all purchase occasions in which656 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, NOVEMBER 2007
Table 7
FIT MEASURES FOR FULL AND BENCHMARK MODELS
Out-of-
Number of Sample Fit
Model Description Parameters Log-Likelihooda AICa BICa Log-Likelihooda
Choice Level
CHOICE1 No separate bundle effect 49 –644.77 1387.53 1778.52 –505.64
CHOICE2 Full model without bundle nest 53 –569.04 1244.07 1666.98 –476.77
CHOICE3 Full model 55 –542.10 1194.20 1633.06 –470.48
Incidence/Quantity Level
INCIQUAN1 No separate bundle effect 15 –455.19 0,940.39 1078.04 –397.91
INCIQUAN2 Full model 27 –312.32 0,678.64 0,926.40 –380.78
aBased on a rescaled likelihood function.
Notes: AIC = Akaike information criterion, and BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
Within-Sample Fit
15We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this test.
consumers qualified for the bundle discount. If the choice
asymmetries captured by our parameter μ are only the result
of the leverage effect, we may expect such asymmetries to
be absent when consumers do not qualify for a bundle dis-
count. On the basis of a series of IIA tests (see McFadden,
Train, and Tye 1976), we find that the IIA assumption holds
for choice situations in which consumers are not eligible for
a bundle discount. (Test results are available on request.)
This finding rules out the possibility that μ captures intrin-
sic item interactions, such as complementarities due to vari-
ety seeking.
Second, we estimate a model with a bundle nest for each
choice regime (in lieu of for Qht ≥ BQt only) but with dif-
ferent scale parameters. When Qht ≥ BQt, the population
mean for μ is virtually identical to that which we report in
Table 5. For Qht < BQt, however, we find a value of 1.02,
which is not significantly different from 1 (p>   .4). This is
in line with our hypotheses. When consumers do not qualify
for the bundle discount, there is no reason to expect a lever-
age effect.
Third, because the leverage effect has implications for
the distribution of market shares across the bundle items,
we verify whether our full model is better able to predict
choice shares within the bundle than a model without bun-
dle nesting (CHOICE2). This analysis includes purchase
occasions on which consumers qualify for the discount
because the leverage effect is active only in those instances.
When we compare actual and estimated within-bundle
choice shares, we obtain a mean absolute deviation of .130
and a mean square error of .044 for CHOICE2. In our full
model, mean absolute deviation and mean square error drop
to .121 and .040, respectively, thus underscoring the impor-
tance of accommodating the leverage effect.15
EVALUATING A BUNDLE PROMOTION’S EFFECTS
In the previous sections, we shed light on the incidence,
quantity, and choice effects triggered by a bundle promo-
tion. At this point, we use the estimated models to simulate
a bundle promotion’s net impact on unit sales. We take the
perspective of both the brand manager, who focuses on the
sales of his or her SKUs, and the retailer, which is mainly
interested in the sales of the whole product category. We
illuminate the role of the bundle characteristics and pit the
bundle’s impact against that of per-unit discounts.
In our simulation, we use consumer-specific coefficients,
which are computed as the means of the consumer-specific
posterior parameter distributions (Train 2002). Time-variant
variables take on average values, and stores’ assortments
reflect actual assortment compositions.
A Bundle Promotion’s Sales Implications for Brand
Managers
To evaluate the effects of bundling from a brand
manager’s perspective, we simulate alternative promotions
in the Lay’s brand line of 5-ounce bags of regular potato
chips, which consists of seven distinct SKUs. Simulations
for another major snack chip brand (consisting of six dis-
tinct SKUs) led to similar results. For each promotion alter-
native, we compute the percentage change in the expected
unit sales for (1) a single SKU (Lay’s Classic, 5 ounces)
that is part of the promotion and (2) the complete Lay’s
brand line. In the Web Appendix (see http://www.marketing
power.com/content84060.php), we derive an expression for
expected unit sales.
In Figure 3, Panels A–C, we depict the percentage
change in the sales for the single SKU (Lay’s Classic, 5
ounces) as a function of the promotional discount. The dis-
count ranges from $.01 to $.28 per unit, with the highest
value being equal to approximately 35% of the regular
price. Each graph corresponds to a specific bundle range
(two, four, and six items) and portrays the effect for three
quantity requirements (BQ = two, four, and six units).
Because our focus is on optimizing the sales of a particular
SKU, we compare the bundle promotions with a per-unit
promotion that applies only to that focal SKU. Several
striking observations emerge.
First, bundle promotions considerably increase the sales
of the focal SKU overall. For example, for a range of four
items (Figure 3, Panel B), when BQ is 2 and the discount is
$.15, the promotion increases the sales of Lay’s Classic by
approximately 150%. The outspokenly positive effects at
the choice level (mere discount, leverage, and discount
communication effects) compensate for the modestly posi-
tive or even negative effects at the incidence and quantity
level.Shopper Response to Bundle Promotions 657
Notes: Per-unit promotions apply only to the focal SKU.
Figure 3
BUNDLE PROMOTION IMPACT ON SKU SALES
A: Range = Two Items
B: Range = Four Items
C: Range = Six Items
Second, raising the bundle quantity requirement
decreases the bundle effect on the focal SKU’s sales. As we
show in Figure 3, Panel B, imposing a quantity requirement
of four instead of two units reduces the previous sales
increase from approximately 150% to approximately 80%.
This is the result of three effects: (1) All else being equal,
an increasing BQ makes the choice regime for Q ≥ BQ with
its leverage and strong mere-discount effect less likely to be
valid, (2) a higher BQ may induce a negative bundle impact
at the incidence level, and (3) increasing BQ beyond a cer-
tain point reduces the bundle impact at the quantity level.
Third, extending the bundle range lifts up the bundle’s
initial impact on Lay’s Classic’s sales. In the switch from a
two-item (Figure 3, Panel A) to a four-item (Figure 3, Panel
B) bundle, the response curves’ intercepts shift upward.
That is, as the bundle range increases, the focal SKU bene-
fits more from the leverage effect. At the same time, the
response curves become flatter; that is, when the bundle
range increases, the focal SKU must share the promotion
effect with more items (cannibalization), such that its sales
become less discount elastic. For higher discounts, this can-
nibalization outweighs the leverage effect, and the focal
SKU’s sales decrease.
Fourth, the marginal contribution of the leverage effect
decreases as the bundle range extends. A comparison of
Panels B and C in Figure 3 indicates that adding another
two items to a four-item bundle does not lead to any notice-
able upward shift of the response curves. Whereas expand-
ing a narrow range triggers leverage, any further range
expansions contribute little to the leverage effect. Instead,
any incremental leverage effect is almost immediately nulli-
fied by a further loss of discount elasticity.
Fifth, bundling the focal SKU with other SKUs can be
more effective than promoting the SKU on a per-unit basis.
For example, in Figure 3, Panel B, a per-unit discount of
$.20 increases sales of Lay’s Classic by approximately
80%, less than half of the sales increase produced by a bun-
dle promotion with BQ = 2. Thus, a condition for effective
bundle promotions appears to be a sufficiently low quantity
requirement. For BQ greater than four, the per-unit promo-
tion outperformed the bundle offer. Finally, in general, bun-
dle ranges beyond four SKUs weaken the bundle’s position
relative to the per-unit promotion because they only trigger
cannibalization without further leveraging up the focal
SKU’s sales.
In Figure 4, Panels A–C, we depict the bundle promo-
tions’ effects on the sales of the complete Lay’s brand line
of regular potato chips. Again, we compare bundles with
per-unit promotions. However, in this case, per-unit promo-
tions pertain to the same range of items as the correspon-
ding bundle promotions. Although the general response pat-
terns appear to be similar to those in Figure 3, we make two
additional observations.
First, the bundle’s sales effects at the brand level are not
always as spectacular as those at the SKU level, especially
for small bundle ranges (Figure 4, Panel A). Because pro-
motional bundles are effective at stimulating switching,
they make strong inroads into the sales of other items,
including the brand’s own nonpromoted SKUs. Still, well-
designed bundle promotions can dramatically improve on
per-unit promotions (that apply to the same range of items).
Second, widening the bundle range always increases the
bundle’s impact on brand sales. Not only a range increase
from two to four items (Panels A and B) but also a further
extension to six items (Panel C) substantially improves the
sales of the Lay’s brand line. This trend occurs for two rea-
sons. In terms of a brand line’s sales volume, putting more
SKUs on deal is always better. Furthermore, broader bun-
dles benefit more from the leverage effect, even if it tapers.658 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, NOVEMBER 2007
Figure 4
BUNDLE PROMOTION IMPACT ON BRAND SALES
A: Range = Two Items
B: Range = Four Items
C: Range = Six Items
Figure 5
BUNDLE PROMOTION IMPACT ON CATEGORY SALES
(RANGE = FOUR ITEMS)
A Bundle Promotion’s Sales Implications for Retailers
Again, we consider various promotions in the Lay’s
brand line, but now we compute their impact on category
sales. Figure 5 presents the results for four-item promotions
only, but we found almost identical graphs for two- and six-
item promotions (with the per-unit discount curve further
tilting upward for larger ranges). The most striking observa-
tion is that bundle promotions, in contrast to per-unit dis-
counts, are ineffective at the category level. For small quan-
tity requirements, any positive bundle impact on purchase
quantity appears to be nullified by adverse bundle effects at
the incidence level. For higher quantity requirements (4
units and higher), the bundle promotion may even lead to a
small decrease in category sales. In other words, although
bundling tends to increase purchase quantities modestly
among consumers who purchase in the category, this effect
is at least neutralized by consumers who refrain from pur-
chasing in reaction to an overly restrictive quantity require-
ment. Finally, the graph shows that the bundle’s response
curves are discount inelastic; the bundle’s performance at
the category level is mainly driven by the quantity
requirement.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigate the purchase effects of bun-
dle promotions in a category of consumer packaged goods.
We calibrate adjusted choice, quantity, and incidence mod-
els on consumer panel data in the snack chip category. The
estimation results and subsequent simulations provide sev-
eral insights. This section indicates how our findings con-
tribute to managerial practice, presents tentative guidelines
for bundle design, and suggests avenues for further
research.
Main Results and Managerial Implications
An important finding of our study is that promotional
bundling is particularly effective for stimulating switching
behavior but less apt to increase category sales. That is,
rather than converting nonusers or light users to heavy
users, bundle promotions attract already heavy users from
other brands. This result stems from the different bundle
mechanisms that govern consumers’ purchase decisions.
At the choice level, intense switching behavior occurs
mostly among consumers who buy enough in the category
to qualify for the bundle discount. For such consumers,
bundle items benefit not only from a strong direct discountShopper Response to Bundle Promotions 659
impact but also from a leverage effect, according to which
one bundle item’s choice probability is enhanced by the
attractiveness of the other bundle items. Surprisingly, even
consumers who purchase less than the bundle’s quantity
requirement and therefore do not qualify for the promotion
tend to switch to the bundle items in response to the adver-
tised discount (the discount communication effect).
At the quantity level, a bundle promotion tends to
increase a consumer’s purchase amount modestly. However,
after the quantity requirement exceeds a (consumer-
specific) critical point, the bundle’s impact shrinks. At the
incidence level, bundling does not generate any positive
effect. Rather, when the quantity requirement increases, a
bundle may reduce the incidence probability.
Taken together, these findings offer some notable impli-
cations for brand managers and retailers alike. Because of
bundle promotions’ pronounced switching effects, a brand
manager may find them to be more rewarding than per-unit
promotions, especially if the primary objective is to
increase a specific item’s unit sales. Bundle-promoting that
item with other brand items allows the manager to exploit
the leverage effect and therefore is more effective than pro-
moting the item on a per-unit basis. For example, to induce
trial purchases for a new potato chip flavor, a brand could
bundle the new flavor with a few relatively established
flavors.
However, retailers aiming to enhance category sales will
find little use for promotional bundles. Although bundling is
successful at redistributing sales across SKUs, it turns out
to be ineffective at the category level. Instead, per-unit pro-
motions substantially increase category sales, such that
retailers pursuing category expansion will be better off pro-
moting on a per-unit basis. For similar reasons, a manufac-
turer that already enjoys a large market share in a product
category may benefit more from per-unit promotions. Given
their positive impact on category sales, per-unit promotions
suffer less from cannibalization.
Designing a Bundle Promotion
Our simulation results underscore the importance of
choosing bundle characteristics carefully. Proper selection
of the bundle range and the quantity requirement in particu-
lar may dramatically improve the bundle promotion’s
performance.
First, if the quantity requirement is set too high, too many
consumers are excluded. These consumers may even react
adversely by deliberately canceling their category purchase
altogether. In general, for any given product category, the
appropriate quantity requirement is expected to depend on
the distribution of consumers’ regular purchase quantities.
For the snack chip category, in which the average purchase
quantity is 2.68 units and many consumers stick to one unit
per purchase occasion, the recommended quantity require-
ment is two units.
Second, the appropriate bundle range depends on the
marketer’s objective. If the focus is on sales of the whole
brand line, the company should include all brand items in
the bundle. If the marketer aims to increase sales of one
specific item, however, it suffices to select only a few
attractive items that can increase sales of the focal item
through the leverage effect. Including too many items leads
to cannibalization of the focal item’s sales. In our applica-
16In 91.9% of the occasions on which a consumer buys enough in the
category to qualify for the bundle discount, the purchase quantity for the
bundle items corresponds to an integer multiple of the bundle quantity
requirement.
tion, we found that a bundle range of three to four items
was most effective, especially for shallow discounts.
Limitations and Further Research
Because this article is the first study of consumers’ reac-
tions to bundle promotions in the context of consumer pack-
aged goods, ample opportunity remains for further research.
Most important, for the sake of generalizability, our find-
ings should be verified in other product categories.
Moreover, although the presented model incorporates the
essential bundle mechanisms, the hierarchical specification
of choice, incidence, and quantity decisions entails some
simplifications. First, as is true for most hierarchical mod-
els, the inclusive value and weighted aggregate discounts in
the incidence/quantity model are based on expected choice
behavior and not on the actual choice outcomes. However,
the “promotion windfall” may inspire consumers to choose
something risky or to indulge in the purchase of an alterna-
tive they otherwise would not buy; the impact of such
choice behavior is not incorporated in our incidence/
quantity model. Second, in the choice model, the bundle
discount becomes “active” from the moment the consumer
buys enough in the category to qualify for the price reduc-
tion. Still, the consumer may buy a quantity of the bundle
items that does not suffice to reap the discount. Although
this did not turn out to be a major problem in our data set,16
further research could refine the modeled relation between
purchase amounts and the validity of the bundle discount.
In addition, we fail to account for at least two compelling
phenomena in our model. First, we ignore the impact of the
bundle’s price/discount presentation because of the lack of
variance in this characteristic. However, an important
stream of experimental research (e.g., Yadav and Monroe
1993) documents the existence of semantic price framing
effects on bundle perceptions. Second, our model structure
does not fully account for the impact of variety seeking on
consumers’ bundle composition. In our approach, variety
seeking within a shopping trip manifests only through the
entropy of the baseline (i.e., in the absence of promotions)
choice probabilities. Thus, our model predicts that for a
given leverage parameter, consumers with equal baseline
probabilities for the different bundle items are more likely
to compose a diversified bundle than consumers with a high
baseline probability for one single bundle item. Even if this
makes intuitive sense, it largely ignores the interactions
between a consumer’s actual choices. That is, we do not
allow for changes in a bundle item’s marginal utility as a
consumer selects units of another bundle item (see Chung
and Rao 2003). Accurately modeling these interactions
would enrich the analysis, because in addition to the lever-
age effect, variety seeking may be an important determinant
of bundle composition.
Furthermore, the scope of our analysis is limited to the
immediate impact on consumer decisions and unit sales. In
view of recent academic interest in the impact of promo-
tions over time (e.g., Pauwels, Hanssens, and Siddarth660 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, NOVEMBER 2007
2002), further research might assess the adjustment and
long-term effects of promotional bundling. To this end, our
model could be embedded in a multiple-period framework,
in line with the work of Silva-Risso, Bucklin, and Morris-
son (1999). Such analysis would also benefit from more
refined purchase-feedback effects, which in our model are
independent of whether the previous purchase was made
under promotional (bundle) conditions or not (Zhang and
Krishnamurthi 2004).17 Future work also could address the
impact of promotional bundles on revenue and profit and
thus account for the often-cited price discriminatory charac-
ter of bundling (Adams and Yellen 1976; Bakos and Bryn-
jolfsson 2000).
Finally, our research uncovers bundle responses that
require further exploration. Specifically, we observe that a
confrontation with (overly stringent) bundle offers may
induce consumers to reduce or drop their category pur-
chases altogether. Whether this response is caused by reac-
tance to managers’ unreasonable promotion offers or by
generalized reference price effects presents yet another
worthwhile topic for additional study.
APPENDIX: ESTIMATED EQUATIONS
Choice Model
If Qht < BQt or in the absence of bundle promotions, the
choice model takes an MNL form, and the utilities are writ-
ten as follows:
When Qht ≥ BQt, we use a nested MNL model with scale
parameter μh and the following utilities:
where
TLOYhi, BLOYhi, =
FLOYhi, SLOYhi = loyalty of consumer h to the type,
brand, flavor, or size of item i, com-
puted over the initialization period;
LThit, LBhit, =
LFhit, LShit = 1 if item i was the last type, brand,
flavor, or size purchased by house-
hold h and 0 if otherwise;
UDit = item i’s per-unit discount on shop-
ping trip t (cents/ounce);
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n γγ γ b b × BDit.
BDit =  item i’s bundle discount on trip t
(cents/ounce). The total bundle dis-
count, as recorded in our database,
is first divided by BQt and then con-
verted into cents/ounce for each
bundle item;
{ }, { }, =
{ },  { } =  type, brand, flavor, and size inter-
cepts for item i, to be estimated;
γtloy, γbloy, =
γfloy, γsloy = parameters to be estimated; and
, , , ,  =
, ,  ,  μh =  independently normally distributed
coefficients (means and variances to
be estimated).
The use of attribute-specific intercepts is in line with Fader
and Hardie’s (1996) work. Our approach to loyalty dynam-
ics is consistent with that of Bucklin and Lattin (1991) and
Silva-Risso, Bucklin, and Morrisson (1999).
Incidence/Quantity Model
Our purchase incidence and quantity models incorporate
the same variables, but with different coefficients. Specifi-
cally, we model the purchase rate and category utility for
consumer h as follows:
where
INCht =  inclusive value of the whole category for
consumer h on shopping trip t, not account-
ing for any promotional effects. Thus,
INCht = ln |UDit = 0,BDit = 0;
CRh = consumption rate for consumer h, computed
over the initialization period;
MCINVht =  consumer h’s mean-centered inventory on
shopping trip t. Following Ailawadi and
Neslin (1998) and Silva-Risso, Bucklin, and
Morrisson (1999), we allow for flexible con-
sumption in the inventory update equation.
Thus, INVht = INVh(t – 1) + qh(t – 1) –
INVh(t – 1) × CRh/[CRh + (INVh(t – 1))τ],
where  τ is the consumption flexibility
parameter (to be estimated);
CUDht =  the weighted average of all per-unit dis-
counts available on shopping trip t, and
CUDht =  , where the
SKU loyalties are computed as the sum of
attribute-specific loyalties (TLOYhi, and so
forth; see the choice model discussion) and
rescaled to add to 1;
CBDht =  category-level bundle discount, computed
similarly to CUDht;
SKULOY UD hi it i × ∑
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17We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.Shopper Response to Bundle Promotions 661
QPht = a bundle promotion’s quantity pressure for
consumer h on shopping trip t, QPht = BQt/
AVQh, where AVQh is the consumer’s aver-





αcr, αinv = parameters to be estimated; and
β , β , =
β , β , =
β , α , =
α , α , =
α , α =  independently normally distributed coeffi-
cients (means and variances to be
estimated).
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